This study investigates trends in consolidation and merger activity in the United States banking industry from 2000 through 2010. Over this period, the U.S. banking industry has consistently experienced over 150 mergers annually, with the largest banking organizations holding an increasing share of banking assets. While the industry has undergone considerable consolidation at the national level, local banking markets have not experienced significant increases in concentration. The dynamics of consolidation raise concerns about competition, output, efficiency, and financial stability. This study uses a comprehensive proprietary data set to examine mergers and acquisitions involving banks and thrifts. The methodology in this paper expands the definition of mergers to include more types of transactions than previous studies on bank mergers.
Introduction
Merger activity and overall consolidation are of particular interest in the U.S. banking industry.
Since 1980, the structure of the U.S. banking industry has changed considerably, with over 10,000 mergers involving more than $7 trillion in acquired assets taking place. Furthermore, the number of institutions has declined dramatically over this period, and the concentration of assets held by the largest institutions has increased. There were 19,069 banks and thrifts operating in the U.S. in 1980 and 7,011 in 2010, a decline of over 60 percent. In 1980, the 10 largest banking organizations held only 13.5 percent of banking assets, increasing to 36 percent by 2000.
2 By 2010, the 10 largest organizations held approximately 50 percent of banking assets. This paper updates previous work on bank merger trends in the U.S. and considers bank merger activity from 2000 through 2010.
As consolidation in the banking industry continues, banking antitrust policy plays a considerable role in shaping how the industry changes. Banking differs from most other industries because mergers and acquisitions must be approved by the relevant bank regulatory authority. antitrust concerns. Unlike other regulators, however, the DOJ cannot deny a merger application; rather, they have to file an injunction to block or undo a merger.
The banking industry has undergone significant regulatory changes in the past 15 years. These regulatory changes have had significant effects on competition and structure, with some changes acting as the impetus for recent merger waves. For example, the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 allowed branch banking beyond one state and throughout the United States, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (Financial Services Modernization Act) allowed banks to enter other financial markets and provide additional financial services.
Both of these laws are potential causes for the increase in bank mergers. With such regulatory 2 From 1980 to 2010, the number of thrifts declined by 75 percent, while the number of banks declined by 55 percent. In our sample from 2000 through 2010, the number of thrifts declined by 28 percent and the number of banks declined by 22 percent. 3 In fact, the United States differs from most other countries because the bank regulators have explicit antitrust authority. In most other countries, only the competition authorities deal with antitrust concerns in banking.
changes and the overall changes in the bank industry structure, banking has moved from a fragmented industry with banks operating only in individual states to a more unified industry, dominated by banks operating in large regions of the country.
Several previous studies discuss bank merger activity over the past 50 years. Three studies by Rhoades (1985 Rhoades ( , 1996 Rhoades ( , 2000 consider bank merger activity from 1960 through 1998 , and Pilloff (2004 considers merger activity from 1994 through 2003. 4 Wheelock (2011) analyzes merger activity during the financial crisis from 2007 through 2010. These papers differ in their sources for bank merger data and how they count bank mergers. The next section will discuss these differences in greater detail.
Research on the motivations for and causes and effects of bank mergers is vast and covers numerous facets of the topic. The data sources employed in this literature vary tremendously as well. Most studies of bank mergers in the United States use regulatory documents, stock price data, and National Information Center (NIC) data, in addition to other sources. These data sources vary in their coverage of bank mergers. 5 This study will not evaluate the quality of the different data sets or evaluate the literature on bank mergers; instead, it will describe a single comprehensive data set of bank merger transactions.
Several survey articles provide overviews of the research on bank mergers: They include Berger, Demsetz, and Strahan (1999); Amel, Barnes, Panetta, and Salleo (2004); and DeYoung, Evanoff, and Molyneux (2009) .
This paper is organized in the following manner. In Section I, the data construction is discussed, and the methodology is compared to that of others. In Section II, overall merger trends and consolidation are described on a national level. In Section III, local market trends are described.
Section IV concludes.
4 Rhoades (1985) considers mergers from 1960 through 1983, Rhoades (1996) considers mergers from 1980 through 1994, and Rhoades (2000) considers mergers from 1980 through 1998. 5 For example, stock data only include banks that are publically traded, and regulator data sources do not necessarily cover transactions between state-chartered banks. Previous studies have measured and defined mergers differently. Rhoades (1985 Rhoades ( , 1996 Rhoades ( , 2000 considered only transactions where one banking organization purchases at least a 25 percent ownership share of the target. In his data, the acquirer is an active operating entity (for at least one year) rather than a de novo or non-operating bank. Both parties are bank holding companies or commercial banks, and both are either U.S. domestic banks or are owned by one. holders, and all high holders are checked to determine if the transaction involves the same high holder for acquirer and target. A transaction is not counted as a merger if the high holder for the acquirer is also a high holder for the target.
I. Merger Data
Unlike previous studies, failed or failing institutions are included in the data. 13 It is important to include these transactions because they undergo the same application and approval process as 11 The result of this methodology is that some transactions in the data used for this paper involving incremental acquisitions of shares are considered to be reorganizations rather than mergers in Pilloff's data. 12 In fact, an investment of 5 percent or more has to be approved by bank regulators, but acquisitions of 5 to 25 percent are generally considered to be noncontrolling. 13 Pilloff (2004) did not include failed or failing institution transactions. Rhoades (1985 Rhoades ( , 1996 Rhoades ( , 2000 included them only when a regulator made a decision on the transaction.
any other transaction (albeit with some modifications if necessary). 14 While the reasons for merging are potentially different, the application is evaluated and could result in a denial.
Rhoades's and Pilloff's methods of counting mergers would result in far fewer mergers from 2008 to 2010 because during these years a large number of failure-based mergers occurred.
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The data in this study also only identify the high holder of an institution as the acquiring firm, without any information about intermediate holding companies. The high holder of an institution is defined as the top-most firm that owns a controlling interest of the depository and all mid-tier holding companies. The majority of institutions are either independent with no high holder or an institution with a single high holder. 16 While this data construction does not reveal details about transactions, such as which subsidiary is purchasing the target institution, it does identify the merging parties. The main drawback is that we cannot directly identify the regulator that approved the transaction, as subsidiary firms may have different regulators. For many of the transactions, most of the differences in criteria for defining mergers and acquisitions do not matter, as most transactions involve a merger of two institutions or the acquisition of a single institution by a holding company. However, a handful of transactions are 14 A conflict could occur between the requirements of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) and antitrust laws governing a failing bank transaction. FDICIA requires that the FDIC pursue a leastcost resolution (to the insurance fund) of failing bank transactions. 15 The previous major period of bank failures was the savings and loan crisis in the 1980s. 16 Some organizations have very complex holding tiers. Pilloff (2004) uses a work case scenario of 13 tiers when checking the SNL data against the NIC data. 17 Sometimes bank holding companies will apply for a bank-to-bank acquisition. If a bank holding company applies for approval, the transaction is evaluated by the Federal Reserve. In a bank-to-bank transaction, the regulator of the applying depository considers the transaction (regardless if the bank is part of a bank holding company). 18 The Call Report and Thrift Financial Report are collected every quarter, whereas the Summary of Deposits is collected every year as of June 30. more complicated and the differences in methodology become more apparent with such transactions. The biggest difference occurs with the inclusion of failed or failing institutions in the years 2008 to 2010. Not including these observations in the data has a significant effect on the observed number of transactions. However, it is important to note that these types of transactions would not have had a major effect on the Pilloff (2004) 
II. National Merger Trends and Consolidation
This Section describes the merger activity and consolidation on a national level. The number and merger characteristics are compared on an annual basis. Overall national consolidation is described and the largest deals are shown. Trends in average and median merger size, as well as percent of industry involved in transactions, were similar with respect to assets, deposits, and number of offices. While average asset and deposits vary significantly from year to year depending on whether very large mergers were consummated, median assets and deposits for the targets were very stable, remaining in a range of $109 million to $196 million for assets and $88 million to $167 million for deposits.
Mergers by Year and Size
The median number of target offices fluctuated between 3 and 4. As shown in subsequent tables, the majority of mergers involve very small depository institutions; in most years, the total percent of industry assets, deposits, or offices acquired were well below 5 percent of industry totals.
In 
Consolidation in the U.S. Banking Industry
Concentration of both assets and deposits for the top 10 banking and thrift organizations increased considerably over the past decade. Table 3 Tables 4 and 5 describe the types of transactions among the different charter types. Table 4 shows the number of mergers, as well as the mean, median, and total amount of assets, deposits, and offices for transactions involving different types of banking institutions. In these Tables,   banks are 
Largest Mergers in Recent Years

III. Local Market and State Trends
In banking antitrust, most concerns arise from competition in local banking markets. Retail MSA markets, 2 in micropolitan markets, and 1 in rural county markets.
The Effect of Bank Mergers on Local Banking Markets
Share per market measures the share of target deposits or of target offices involved in mergers.
Over 14 percent of market deposits and offices are acquired annually, on average, with median values closer to 10 percent. Both the average and median percent of market deposits and offices acquired increase as market population decreases (from MSA to rural counties), even though the number of mergers is much greater in MSA markets than in rural markets. Rural markets typically have fewer institutions with greater market shares, so when a merger occurs in a rural market, it usually involves a larger share of market deposits.
Remedies to alleviate the competitive effects of merger applications are sometimes required.
The main remedy for merger applications is the divestiture of branches in local markets where the competitive effects cannot be mitigated by other factors. Of the 2,399 mergers that occurred, approximately 101 transactions required divestitures in 159 markets before the Federal Reserve approved the transaction.
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Next, it is important to see how merger activity affected local market concentration. Table 8 describes average Herfindahl-Hirschman Indices (HHI), average number of organizations, and average number of offices for MSA markets, micropolitan markets, and rural county markets.
For the purposes of this exercise, thrift deposits are weighted at 50 percent. 31 During the past decade, average local market concentration decreased in all types of local markets: MSA average concentration fell from 1,641 to 1,622, micropolitan concentration fell from 2,393 to 30 The SNL Financial data do not note if a transaction involved any divestitures. The number of divestitures was obtained from data on Board Orders from 2000 through 2010. These data do not include any divestitures required by other bank regulators or by the Department of Justice. 31 In the FRB's standard structural analysis, thrifts are only given 50 percent weight because they do not provide all banking services. Typically, thrifts do not engage in business lending and services. In merger applications to the Federal Reserve, thrifts that provide all banking services are given 100 percent weight.
increased in all types of markets: The mean number of institutions increased from 48 to 54 in MSAs, from 9 to 10 in micropoiltan, and from 5 to 6 in rural markets. Finally, the mean number of branches increased in MSA and micropolitan markets and remained constant in rural markets:
In MSA markets, the mean number of branches increased from 493 to 568 branches; in micropolitan, from 24 to 25 branches; and in rural, it remained constant at 10 branches 
The Prevalence of Bank Mergers within or across State Lines
In addition to overlap in local banking markets, we also consider in-state and 
IV. Conclusion
Bank merger activity over the past decade has continued at a fairly steady pace. The recent financial crisis resulted in a decrease in the number of mergers and a shift in the types of mergers from traditional mergers or acquisitions to mainly acquisitions of failed or distressed institutions.
The decade saw a dramatic increase in concentration of banking assets at the national level by the largest institutions. Even with that increase, around 7,000 institutions remain.
Merger activity should continue at a steady pace. During the past decade, most mergers and acquisitions occurred between small and medium-sized institutions with less than $30 billion in assets. With around 7,000 institutions, of which 99 percent are small to medium sized, this trend should continue into the future. However, the new Dodd-Frank regulations will increase the regulatory hurdles for large institutions to complete a transaction, regardless of the size of the target. 33 Some states require that a bank already have a branch presence in the state before it is able to build more branches in the state. 34 In fact, entry follows the same pattern. Bank entry into new markets very rarely crosses state lines. 35 Transactions cannot be weighted by assets for any geographic level less than national because assets are reported only at the institution level. 
